Despite the quality of Curtis' work, his impact on legal scholarship in this area has been limited. 26 Some scholars have made positive assessments of Bingham's abilities, 27 but others continue to adhere to Fairman's characterization of Bingham as inept and unintelligible. 2 8 Fairman's view-that Bingham was a confused man and that his views provide no guidance when attempting to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment-continues to pervade legal scholarship.
This view and the analysis that supports it are wrong. Building on the work of Crosskey, Curtis, and Alfred Avins, 29 this Article seeks to strengthen the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the first eight amendments to the states. In particular, this Article focuses on the ideas and influence of John Bingham, the Amendment's principal author. It identifies several sources, some not previously discussed in the literature on this subject, which demonstrate that Bingham intended the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states and that many of his contemporaries shared his belief regarding the Amendment's purpose. This Article also argues that Fairman misread critical sources, relied on information taken out of context, ignored important contemporary materials, and buttressed his argument with a flawed legal theory. As a result, this Article argues, Fairman's portrait of John Bingham is distorted and unfaithful to the historical evidence.
Part I of this Article describes the 1947 dispute between Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Hugo Black over incorporation and summarizes argued that Fairman unfairly judged the evidence supporting incorporation. Although Amar did not find support in the historical record for what he termed "mechanical incorporation"--the literal application of the first eight amendments to the states-he nevertheless concluded that, under a doctrine he labelled "refined incorporation," those portions of the first eight amendments that protect personal rights should be enforced against the states. 28. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1404 n. 61 (1992) ("Bingham's speeches were highly rhetorical, and his thoughts are hard to follow; he was undoubtedly a gasbag. 'Whether he was also a gashead is a more difficult and controversial question. My view is that either Bingham Part IV addresses Fairman's most credible argument. Fairman noted that during the period of the Amendment's ratification, jury practices of many states did not comply with the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Fairman argued that had state representatives understood the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states, they would not have voted to ratify the Amendment without first discussing the need to change provisions in their own constitutions and statutes that conflicted with the Bill of Rights. Part IV concludes, however, that the conflicts Fairman identified lack the interpretive power he attributed to them because, as Fairman's own examples indicate, many supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment were either unaware of or unconcerned with these conflicts. Part V documents the consistency between Bingham's views and the earliest federal cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. It demonstrates that subsequent decisions such as the Slaughter-House Cases 0 and United States v. Cruikshank repudiate rather than express the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part VI concludes that Bingham's views on the Fourteenth Amendment should be credited and Fairman's scholarship on this subject disregarded. This Part sketches the application of Bingham's views to the current constitutional landscape and notes changes in incorporation doctrine that logically follow. Finally, it outlines the challenge to originalist thinkers to determine how the Supreme Court can properly determine which privileges or immunities, beyond the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment protects. [Vol. 103: 57
On Misreading John Bingham

I. ADAMSON, FAIRMAN, AND THE REPUDIATION OF INCORPORATION
In Adamson v. California, 32 the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred state constitutional and statutory provisions permitting a prosecutor or the court to comment on a defendant's failure to testify. The Court assumed without deciding that the state laws at issue would infringe on a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "if this were a trial in a court of the United States." 33 But Justice Stanley F. Reed, writing for the majority, concluded that "[i]t is settled law" that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect an individual from state, as opposed to federal, action. 34 Adamson is best remembered for the dispute between Justices Frankfurter and Black concerning just how "settled" was the law on which the majority relied. Justice Black reviewed "the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment" and concluded that the Amendment's framers intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. Justice Black relied primarily on the views of John Bingham and quoted a number of the speeches Bingham had made during the pendency of the Fourteenth Amendment. These speeches indicate that Bingham sought a constitutional amendment to overrule Barron v. Baltimore, 36 which had held that the Bill of Rights could not be enforced against the states.
37 Justice Black noted that because Bingham believed that the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens were "chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United 32. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) . 33 . Id. at 50. 34. Id. at 50-51. Nearly twenty years later, the Court decided that its holding in Adamson had been incorrect. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) . While the Court expressly overruled Adamson, it held the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not its Privileges or Immunities Clause, encompassed the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
35. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black insisted that the Court had never thoroughly considered the "relevant historical evidence" concerning the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers, and attached to his opinion an appendix summarizing the Amendment's history. Id. at 92-123 app. Accounting for thirty-two pages of the official report of Adamson, this appendix quotes from the congressional debates relevant to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-one of these pages contain excerpts from speeches by John Bingham in which he argued for the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the proposed amendment. A half century earlier, Wall Street lawyer William D. Guthrie relied on some of the same legislative history used by Justice Black to conclude that Congress had intended the Fourteenth Amendment to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. WIr-LiAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58-59 (1898). In 1908, Horace Flack evaluated accounts in selected contemporary newspapers regarding the Amendment's purpose and reached the same conclusion as Guthrie. HORACE E. FLACK In evaluating the evidence cited by Justice Black, Fairman acknowledged that Bingham was a "key figure" whose views were of "great significance" to a study of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Bingham " an effective debater, well informed, ready and versatile"; Sherman described Bingham as one of the "most eloquent" members of the House who "took a leading part in all the debates."). By distinguishing oratory abilities from analytic ones, Fairman sought to credit Blaine and Sherman without discrediting his own evaluation of Bingham. This distinction, however, is artificial and misrepresents the nature of Blaine's and Sherman's praise. Albert Riddle, writing in 1880 but drawing on his experience in Congress between 1861 and 1863, indicated that the Congress was "not a great admirer of eloquence" and that "the mere maker of speeches, is the most useless of men." ALBERT G. Fairman summarized the content of the proposal, cited Bingham's concerns that Congress had no power to enforce "this immortal bill of rights," and quoted the first portion of Bingham's speech cited above. 59 Fairman next provided his interpretation: Consider Bingham's expression, "these great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution." What is the antecedent? Evidently, the "privileges and immunities" (Art. IV, § 2), and the rights of "life, liberty, and property" of the Fifth Amendment-these comprise "the immortal bill of rights." In this spacious gesture Bingham certainly does not seem to be making any particular reference to Amendments I to VIII. Let us take note that, on this occasion at any rate, "the immortal bill of rights" is to Bingham 
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Fairman insisted that Bingham's reference to "this immortal bill of rights" did not refer to the first eight amendments. 6 1 Rather, Fairman suggested, Bingham used the term "immortal bill of rights" to refer to the proposed amendment's protection of a citizen's privileges and immunities and to its protection of the rights to life, liberty and property. The implication is that by using the term immortal bill of rights to encompass both privileges and immunities and life, liberty and property, Bingham indicated that he viewed the protection of life, liberty and property as separate and distinct from the protection of a citizen's privileges and immunities and could not have believed the former to be a component of the latter. And if a citizen's privileges and immunities did not include elements of the Fifth Amendment-the protection of life, liberty and property-it follows that Bingham could not have believed the first eight amendments defined the content of a citizen's privileges and immunities. 62 As a result, Fairman insisted, Bingham's reference to "this immortal bill of rights" did not refer to the first eight amendments, but rather to two specific provisions of the Constitution. It was this unconventional usage of the term "Bill of Rights" which, in part, led Fairman to conclude Bingham's beliefs were idiosyncratic. 6 3 Yet, a more reasonable interpretation of Bingham's February 26 speech exists. An examination of the language of the proposed Amendment shows that its "privileges and immunities" clause would apply only to citizens, whereas its "life, liberty, and property" clause would apply more expansively to "all persons." 64 It is logical to read the new amendment's protection of life, liberty, and property as representing one privilege and immunity of citizenship-and one worthy of extension equally, not only among citizens but 61. Fairman's reading, in part, depends on Bingham's use of the word "this" rather than "the" preceding the words "bill of rights." By using "this," Bingham may have meant the Bill of.Rights as applied by Article IV, Section 2 and including Fifth Amendment protections. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. It may be that Bingham misspoke or the Congressional Globe erred in its transcription of the speech. Perhaps, as Crosskey has suggested, Bingham held a copy of the Constitution and was gesturing with it when he uttered the word "this.' Crosskey, supra note 11, at 28. Whatever the case, an examination of Bingham's speeches on the Fourteenth Amendment in addition to his February 28, 1866, speech in particular, suggests that Fairman's reading is incorrect.
62. Fairman himself believed that Article IV, Section 2's protection of privileges and immunities could not encompass the first eight amendments. He argued that Article IV could not have included the provisions of the Bill of Rights since the Bill of Rights was adopted after the adoption of Article IV. Fairman, supra note 1, at 61-62. Problems with this argument are threefold. First, the relevant question to determine intent is what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed and intended, not whether their intent was based on a historically correct view of the Constitution. Second, if, as some scholars believe, the Bill of Rights is declaratory, affirming preexisting rights, rather than setting forth new ones, see Amar, supra note 25, at 1205-12, the protections contained in the Bill of Rights could have been privileges and immunities notwithstanding the later adoption of the Bill of Rights. Third, even if, prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Article IV had been confined to privileges and immunities such as the writ of habeas corpus, the adoption of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights arguably expanded the content of federal privileges and immunities. For arguments to this effect, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 475 The national citizenship theory, the first component of Bingham's constitutional theory, holds that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 protects rights of national rather than state citizenship. In numerous speeches before, during, and after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham argued in support of this theory. In 1859, for example, Bingham opposed the admission of Oregon to the Union because, he argued, while the new state ostensibly would be "free," its constitution excluded African Americans from entering and denied access to the state courts to those who did. 67 Bingham argued that these provisions in the Oregon Constitution violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. He explained that the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV, Section 2 belonged to citizens "in" the several states, and not to citizens "of' the several states. 68 Bingham's analysis suggests that the second time Article IV, Section 2 refers to the term "citizens," the term may refer to citizens either "of states" or "of the United States." Bingham believed that, properly interpreted, the Clause would read: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 65. Id. 66. Much of the substance of Bingham's views can be found in the transcripts of public statements he made on the floor of Congress. Bingham's hometown newspaper, the Cadiz Republican, reprinted many of his speeches; others were bound in pamphlet form for mass distribution. Since these speeches were intended for circulation among constituents as well, they "provide clues to the sentiments of [ The consequences of this reading are important. The alternative reading that the terms "of citizens" means "of state citizens" renders Article IV, Section 2 a variant equal protection clause, simply requiring a state to treat equally its own citizens and the citizens of other states within its borders. By contrast, if the reference is to "citizens of the United States," then the provision implies the existence of substantive national rights which states may not deny. Bingham articulated the latter interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 in seven additional congressional speeches between 1861 and 1868." 0 The Bill of Rights theory, the second component of Bingham's constitutional theory, argues that the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens include, at a minimum, the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
7 ' While Bingham often referred to certain of these provisions individually, 72 he believed that 71. Crosskey, supra note I1, at 27-28; CUtrs, supra note 24, at 58-71. 72. For instance, in 1862 Bingham stated, "The great privilege and immunity of... American citizen[s] to be respected everywhere in this land.., is that they shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862). On other occasions Bingham suggested that among the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV, Section 2 were the rights to freedom of speech, press, conscience, assembly, trial by jury, and the right to bear arms. The third component of Bingham's constitutional theory, the compact theory, holds that even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution prohibited states from abridging the first eight amendments. According to Bingham, Article IV, Section 2 applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states, but the absence of an express clause granting Congress enforcement authority meant that while a compact existed that bound the states to comply with Section Two, no remedy was available when the states breached this obligation. For instance, in 1866, Bingham insisted that the states had no right to "abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic," and yet they had done so without repercussion, since Congress lacked the authority to prevent such action. 74 Fairman correctly noted that Bingham believed that Article IV, Section 2 barred the states from abridging the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Section, and that Congress had no enforcement authority. 75 Yet since Fairman misunderstood Bingham's national citizenship and Bill of Rights theories, Fairman minimized the importance of the compact theory. Fairman did not acknowledge that, under the compact theory, the Constitution imposed on the states an unenforceable obligation to guarantee, at a minimum, the first eight amendments.
The final component of Bingham's constitutional theory, the enforcement theory, holds that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the enforcement power absent from Article IV, Section 2. Bingham, in his speeches preceding, during, and after the Amendment's ratification, consistently and repeatedly stated that the new Amendment's purpose was to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.
On January 25, 1866, two years before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham made clear his belief that the federal government should be empowered to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. Bingham spoke in general terms about what was to become the Fourteenth Amendment, then pending before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 76 He said it was a of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce "all the limitations for personal protection of every article and section of the Constitution." Id.
73 80 which had held, respectively, that the Fifth and Seventh Amendments did not limit the states. 8 Bingham stated, "Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States. 82 Bingham said that Barron v. Baltimore "makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment., 83 The pamphlet version of Bingham's speech on the floor of Congress was subtitled a speech "in support of the proposed amendment to enforce the bill of rights. 8 4 On March 9, 1866, Bingham voiced his opposition to the pending Civil Rights Bill. Bingham stated that "the enforcement of the bill of rights is the want of the Republic.
8 5 Bingham and James Wilson debated whether Congress already had the authority to pass legislation enforcing the Bill of Rights or whether, as Bingham believed, a constitutional amendment was necessary.
8 6 Bingham said that he wanted the federal Bill of Rights "enforced everywhere" and that this goal could be accomplished only by a constitutional amendment. 87 He said that he advocated an amendment "which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath, and punish all by express authority of the Constitution to do that by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do, and have never even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.
'
By using the word "abridge," Bingham suggested that the Amendment would not create new privileges or immunities. 92 Rather, its purpose was to protect, by creating an enforcement power, existing privileges and immunities. After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham, speaking on behalf of a majority of the House Judiciary Committee, summarized his constitutional theory:
The fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the powers of the States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the provision of the second section, fourth article. 93 However, the historical evidence reveals that Bingham's views of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment were not idiosyncratic. Elements of his national citizenship, Bill of Rights, compact, and enforcement theories can be found in traditional antislavery theory, 9 ' and in the opinions of wellknown lawyers, judges, and political leaders. During speeches on the floor of the House and Senate, several congressional leaders espoused positions consistent with Bingham's theories. The authors of three contemporary legal treatises each shared Bingham's view concerning the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 1292 (emphasis added
A. Antislavery Constitutionalism
Many antislavery activists shared Bingham's national citizenship, Bill of Rights, and compact Theories. A major tenet of antislavery constitutionalism held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were among Article IV's privileges and immunities and that all the provisions of Article IV, except the Wolcott pointed out that, by contrast, the Constitution included a congressional enforcement power for the Full Faith and Credit Clause."' Wolcott argued that this specific grant of power to Congress demonstrated that when the framers intended Congress to have a given power, they granted the power expressly. In his view, the lack of express power to enforce the other provisions of Article IV meant no such power existed."' As a result, Congress could not compel states to return fugitive slaves. Though the threeperson majority in Bushnell did not adopt Wolcott's argument, Wolcott's reasoning won the votes of dissenting Judges Brinkerhoff and Sutliff." 2 Thus, antislavery constitutional theory held that the absence of specific provisions giving the federal government the power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the Fugitive from Justice Clause meant that those clauses set forth duties enjoined on the states but unenforceable by the federal government. Certainly, this view was not undisputed 112. 9 Ohio St. at 225-27 (Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting), 234-36 (Sutliff, J., dissenting). Judge Brinkerhoff concluded that most of Article Iv's provisions were "mere articles of compact between the states" and that they did not give Congress "any power whatsoever" to enforce those provisions. The political aftermath of the Bushnell decision demonstrates that, at least in Ohio, a great deal of popular support existed for Bingham's view of the Constitution. The three-to-two majority rejecting the antislavery view consisted of two Democrats and one Republican, Chief Judge Joseph R. Swan. While Swan had previously enjoyed considerable popularity and prestige," 5 the Republican Convention of 1859 denied Swan renomination by a vote of 217 to 140. 116 While Swan was repudiated, dissenting Judge Brinkerhoff was celebrated. A well-known Free-Soil Democratic Congressman prior to his service on the Court, Brinkerhoff was re-nominated and re-elected to the Court twice after the publication of his dissent in Bushnell, once in 1860, and again in 1864."' According to one historian, the "entire issue" of Brinkerhoff's 1860 re-election campaign was his judicial opposition to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. l "' Brinkerhoff's sweeping 1860 victory was the Ohio Republican Party's "most brilliant one" up to that time. In reference to persons, we must see to it, that hereafter, personal liberty and personal rights are placed in the keeping of the nation; that the right to life, liberty, and property shall be guarantied [sic] to the citizen in reality as they now are in the words of the Constitution, and no longer left to the caprice of mobs or the contingencies of local legislation. If our Constitution does not now afford all the powers necessary to that end, we must ask the people to add them. We must give full force and effect to the provision that "no citizen shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." We must make it as true in fact as it is in law, that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." We must make American citizenship the shield that protects every citizen, on every foot of our soil. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 67 (Feb. 1, 1866). In contemplating a possible constitutional amendment, Garfield may have viewed the Fifth Amendment as providing the sole content of a citizen's privileges and immunities. Yet, Garfield's references placing "personal liberty and personal rights" within national protection and to "American citizenship" suggest that Garfield, like Bingham, may have read the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to protect the rights of U.S., not state, citizenship. He may have viewed the provisions of the Fifth Amendment as representing some but by no means all the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens.
131. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 117 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Two generations later, Justice Roberts, while accepting the interpretation that Article IV, Section 2 merely prohibited discrimination against citizens of other states, noted that earlier some people had thought that "the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United States" by guaranteeing natural rights. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 Rather than promoting an eccentric view of the Constitution, Bingham articulated a theory consistent with the views of many contemporary leading political leaders and journalists. While this accord does not indicate that Bingham's views met with universal approval, it does demonstrate that they were not "singular."
C. Legal Theorists
Fairman asserted that Bingham's constitutional theory was idiosyncratic. In fact, Bingham's understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment fell within the mainstream of legal thought during the critical 1866 to 1868 period. At least four legal writers published constitutional law treatises in 1867 and 1868, during and shortly after the ratification process. 57 Three of these treatises explicitly support Bingham's theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fourth is silent on the point.
Judge Farrar
In 1867, after the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed but before it was ratified, Judge Timothy Farrar published his Manual of the Constitution of the United States. 15 In this treatise, Farrar set forth a constitutional theory 155. Id. 156. The Nation argued that Congress could use its enforcement power to remedy the enforcement of a state statute that violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Amendment provided no authority for Congress to remedy the maladministration of otherwise proper state laws. Rather, the Nation argued, the ballot box and public opinion provided the only remedies for these violations. Id.
157. The authors discussed in this Section quite possibly are the only legal scholars who published legal treatises of the Fourteenth Amendment contemporaneously with its ratification. I found no source that purports to compile all the constitutional law treatises from this period. The right of every person to "life, liberty, and property," to "keep and bear arms," to the "writ of habeas corpus," to "trial by jury," and divers others, are recognized by, and held under, the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be infringed by individuals or States, or even by the government itself. and Justice Johnson in Houston v. Moor 6 2 to argue that the Fifth Amendment applied to both state and national governments. 163 He listed the rights of citizens applicable to both governments, paraphrasing and citing all of the first ten amendments. 164 Thus, like Bingham, Farrar believed that Article IV, Section 2 had already made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Farrar wrote, "The clause itself, however, supplies no means for its own execution, and directly invokes no legislative aid from Congress. For more than three quarters of a century, without any legislation or governmental action of any sort, it stood a perfect dead letter in the Constitution." ' 6 Unlike Bingham, however, Farrar believed that, even prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had had the authority to enact legislation enforcing Article IV. Farrar viewed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as such an effort. 166 Still, Farrar fully agreed with Bingham's enforcement theory concerning the purpose and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 1872 edition of his treatise, Farrar again noted judicial precedents that had held the Bill of Rights inapplicable against the States, but, under the title "Settled 
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 57 that Bingham's constitutional theory fell within the legal mainstream. Paschal was a prominent politician, lawyer, jurist, and law professor. t 74 Paschal published his treatise while the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was pending. 175 He called on his readers to consider "carefully" the effect of the Amendment, and then he proposed to explain that effect. 176 Paschal cited Farrar's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment with approval.
77
Paschal viewed the citizenship clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as constitutionalizing Section One of the Civil Rights Act. 78 Of the remainder of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, he wrote:
All else in this section has already been guaranteed in the second and fourth section of the fourth article; and in the thirteen amendments. The new feature declared is that the general principles which had been construed to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed upon the States. Most of the States, in general terms, had adopted the same bill of rights in their own constitutions.1 In an 1870 speech, Paschal listed actions that were prohibited to both the federal government and the states. These included:
establishing religion, or preventing the free exercise thereof; abridging the freedom of speech, of the press, or the right of petition; instituting domiciliary visits; abolishing grand juries and jury trial for the citizen not connected with the military service; invading life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or in any manner violating the most enlarged principles of republican government. PASCHAL, LECTURE, reprinted in PASCHAL 1876, supra note 174, at xli. Not surprisingly, Bingham endorsed Paschal's treatise. In a January 14, 1869, letter to Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes, Bingham indicated that he considered Paschal's book to be "a want by the whole country."' 182 Bingham encouraged Hayes to purchase copies of the book for members of the state legislature because "it is well to give public officials the means of more fully understanding [the Constitution's] sure and essential provisions."' 8 3 Four years later, as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Bingham asked the House of Representatives to purchase ten thousand copies of Paschal's book for distribution to members of the House. Though Bingham's praise for the book focused on its treatment of Supreme Court cases, he noted that "it is an aid really to every Representative in Congress."'" Following his appointment as minister to Japan, Bingham indicated that he wanted Paschal's treatise included with the books for the Japanese Legation. 185 Bingham was but one of many national leaders impressed with Paschal's work. Representative William Lawrence, 8 6 Senator George Vickers,' 87 Representative James Garfield, t8 8 and Senator Lyman Trumbull 89 relied on Paschal's 1868 treatise during speeches on the floor of Congress. The Constitutional Convention of Texas and some state legislatures purchased copies. 90 Justice Samuel Miller referred to the treatise as a "very valuable work." 19 ' Former Representative Albert Riddle, a Washington lawyer and law professor at the Howard University Law Department, praised the treatise as "the most convenient and useful, the most extensive and valuable digest of these precedents we have."' 92 Speaking of Paschal, Riddle concluded that Paschal "accurately apprehended the Constitution in all its aspects."' 93 Paschal's treatise and the praise for it suggest that people who disagreed with Bingham on many political issues nevertheless shared his view concerning the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. While Farrar and Bingham both opposed slavery, Paschal was no abolitionist. Paschal was originally a Jacksonian Democrat and a slaveholder. 194 Shortly after the Civil War, Paschal said that he had supported "every measure which extended the area of slavery" and that he had believed it "was religiously, morally and economically right, wise and just." In this treatise, Pomeroy described the provisions of the first eight amendments as "the immunities and privileges guarded by the Bill of Rights.,, 2 0 4 He suggested that the generality of the language used in the first eight amendments could be read to indicate the amendments applied to the states as well as to the national government. 20 In a contemporary review of Pomeroy's volume, the Nation praised it as a "statesmanlike" investigation of the Constitution and labelled the author "so impartial a writer. 218 The Nation endorsed Pomeroy's view that the Bill of Rights was not as yet enforceable against the states and, consequently, argued that the pending Fourteenth Amendment should be adopted. 9 In 
Justice Cooley
In In his 1949 article, Fairman noted the "absence" of any reference to the application of the Bill of Rights against the states in the first three editions of Justice Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 22 implying that Cooley had discussed the Fourteenth Amendment without referring to the Bill of Rights. In fact, Justice Cooley made no reference at all to the Fourteenth Amendment in his 1868 edition. 26 Although published in September, after both Congress and the Secretary of State declared the Fourteenth Amendment ratified, 227 Cooley never discussed the new Amendment. Thus, Cooley's view, at the time of ratification, of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is not available.
Cooley published his second edition of Constitutional Limitations in 1871. This edition includes two statements which can be interpreted to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states. After discussing the Citizenship Clause, Cooley wrote: "[I]t may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same section surround the citizen with any protections additional to those before possessed under the State Constitutions; but... a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a part of the Constitution of the United States. 228 Cooley then stated that he considered it "conceded" that privileges and immunities included the right to "protect and defend" one's property "in the law" and the "enforcement of other personal rights. As a synopsis of Cooley's position, Fairman wrote: "The matter was pending before the Supreme Court and perhaps it was not proper to comment; but if the claim were to be upheld, 'an innovation will be made in our system which ought not to be made without careful consideration and deliberate intention.' Evidently he did not approire. ' 1 The offending provision of the Oregon Constitution, which discriminated against African Americans, was not repealed until November 2, 1926.2 Nevertheless, Fairman indicated that the Republican majority in the state legislature voted to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Republican majority did so even though the state constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause-a portion of the Fourteenth Amendment that explicitly applied against the state regardless whether Section One also incorporated the Bill of Rights.
Thus, Fairman's examples do not support his conclusion. Jurists and scholars like Judge Paschal perceived no conflict between state constitutional, on the one hand, and the Bill of Rights on the other. To the extent that such conflicts did exist, the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to resolve the conflicts by enforcing the Bill of Rights. Fairman's examples, Senator Howard and the statutory provision of Michigan, in fact indicate that such conflicts provide no assistance in interpreting the Amendment. His Oregon example indicates that even when a specific conflict between the Fourteenth Amendment and a state constitutional provision existed, states nevertheless took the seemingly inconsistent action of ratifying the Amendment and failing to repeal the offending state provision.
V. INIAL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Notwithstanding Fairman's assertions to the contrary, Bingham was a respected lawyer and congressman; his reasoning was cogent and consistent; and his view that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states was widely shared by contemporary politicians and legal scholars. An analysis of the initial judicial interpretations concerning the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that several judges also believed that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights against the states. This Section will 251. Fairman, supra note 1, at 31-32 (citing CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1065 (1865) and quoting Bingham's statement that the Fourteenth Amendment "is to apply to other States also that have in their constitutions and laws to-day provisions in direct violation of every principle of our Constitution.... It applies unquestionably to the State of Oregon.").
252. Fairman, supra note 1, at 32 n.58.
253.
Id. at 89.
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show that subsequent opinions reaching the opposite conclusion repudiated rather than expressed the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers. The Fourteenth Amendment was declared ratified on July 28, 1868.4 Nearly two years passed before a federal circuit court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 2 5 decided on June 10, 1870, the court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed not only equality of privileges or immunities, but also "that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired. ' ' as 6 In particular, Justice Bradley, in his capacity as Circuit Justice, concluded that the privileges of the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to pursue a lawful occupation without interference by "odious monopolies. ' ' as 7 The Court considered whether the law granting the monopoly conflicted with a "fundamental privilege" or was a permissible police regulation. It held that police regulations "cannot [interfere with liberty of conscience, nor with the entire equality of all creeds and religions before the law. Nor can they] ... interfere with the fundamental privileges and immunities of American citizens. ' the second federal case to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley replied that fundamental rights such as speech and assembly were privileges or immunities of national citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 60 Judge Woods adopted Bradley's interpretation.
Judge Woods stated that, "Before the fourteenth amendment, congress could not impair [the rights contained in the first eight amendments], but the states might. Since the fourteenth amendment, the bulwarks about these rights have been strengthened, and now the states are positively inhibited from impairing or abridging them .... 2 6 ' The court specifically stated that "the right of freedom of speech, and the other rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the constitution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States ... secured by the constitution." 262 Two of the first federal prosecutions in 1871 under the Enforcement Act of 1870263 provide support for the view that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states. At issue was whether the Second Amendment's right to bear arms in one's home could be enforced against private individuals. The local U.S. Attorney, the Attorney General of the United States, and the grand jury returning the indictments thought they could.
As Robert Kaczorowski noted, even defense counsel, former Attorney General Henry Stanberry and Fourteenth Amendment opponent Senator Reverdy Johnson, agreed that the privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to keep and bear arms. 264 They simply argued that those protections applied only to state actors and did not allow the federal government to take action against private parties. This defense is consistent with John Bingham's position.
A year later, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases by a five to four vote. 265 The Slaughter-House plaintiffs submitted portions of Bingham's congressional speeches, along with those of other members of Congress, in their brief to the Court. 266 The Court, however, did not refer to the debates on the Amendment or the ratification process. Instead, it relied on its own view of the purpose of the Amendment. 267 The Court held that the right to pursue a lawful occupation without restraint by a state-granted monopoly was not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Still, the precise question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights was not before the Court and remained unclear. 268 At least two senators, though, who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment rejected Justice Miller's interpretation. 269 Four years after the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment initially articulated by the lower federal courts. In United States v. Cruikshank, 2 0 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Waite, held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Bill of Rights to the states. 27' This was a repudiation of original intent rather than an attempt to apply it.
Indeed, many contemporary observers of the Court's decisions agreed with this assessment. 22 In 1876, Senator Oliver Morton suggested that the Supreme Court had distorted the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: "The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments which we supposed broad, ample, and specific, have, I fear, been very much impaired by construction, and one of them in some respects almost destroyed by construction." 273 Similarly, in 1886 former Congressman and U.S. Senator James Blaine lamented that as a result of Supreme Court decisions:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment has been deprived in part of the power which Congress no doubt intended to impart to it....
Undoubtedly a large proportion of the members of the Congress, while following the lead of those who constructed the Fourteenth Amendment, sincerely believed that it possessed a far greater scope than judicial inquiry and decision have left to it. 274 At the Supreme Court Memorial Service for Chief Justice Waite in 1888, Ohio Congressman Samuel Shellabarger noted that Justice Waite's decision in United States v. Cruikshank 2 75 contravened the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2 76 "[M]any of the framers of these Amendments received information regarding their intentions which was new, and was not calculated to allay the apprehensions with which they saw Chief Justice Waite go upon the bench. ' 277 Shellabarger said that historians would later praise Waite primarily because "the lapse of years has matured men's views and cooled their feelings regarding the results of the late war." 78 Like many others, Congressman Shellabarger was content with the Court's failure to enforce the "original" intent.
Three -years later, Justice Brewer noted that "many of those who wrought into the Constitution the Fourteenth Amendment believed that they were placing therein a national guarantee against future State invasion of private rights, but judicial decisions have shorn it of strength, and left it nothing but a figure of speech." 279 Bruce R. 
